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After reminding the main issues at stake in the famous Einstein-Bohr debate initiated in 1935, we
tentatively propose a way to get them closer, thus shedding a new light on this historical discussion.
A. The historical debate.
Realism in physics is often understood as the idea that
all physical objects are built up by assembling smaller (or
more elementary) objects, and that all objects carry their
own properties, whatever their level in this construction.
This idea works fine in classical physics, but is clearly
more problematic in quantum physics, where the nature
of objects becomes more elusive, and where it is dubious
that a single object carries its own properties, especially
when it is considered to be part of an entangled set.
Unhappy with this elusive character of quantum me-
chanics (QM), Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) ex-
pressed their own view of realism [1] in a stronger and
more definite statement, saying that, “If, without in any
way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty
(i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a phys-
ical quantity, then there exists an element of physical
reality corresponding to this physical quantity”.
Yet, Niels Bohr disagreed. In his answer, written also
in 1935 [2], he wrote: “EPR’s criterion of physical reality
contains an ambiguity in the meaning of ‘without in any
way disturbing a system’. Of course there is no mechan-
ical disturbance of the system under investigation, but
there is an influence on the very conditions which de-
fine the possible types of predictions regarding the future
behavior of the system. These conditions constitute an
inherent element of the description of any phenomenon
to which the term ‘physical reality’ can be properly at-
tached”. These statements by Bohr were mostly ac-
cepted, but not really understood: what are these “very
conditions” quoted as inherent elements to speak about
physical reality? We will try to clarify this issue below.
In the 1960’s, Bohr gave his own full-fledged defini-
tion of what physics should be [3]: “Physics is to be
regarded not so much as the study of something a priori
given, but rather as the development of methods of or-
dering and surveying human experience. In this respect
our task must be to account for such experience in a man-
ner independent of individual subjective judgement and
therefore objective in the sense that it can be unambigu-
ously communicated in ordinary human language”. But
this latter statement sounded extreme, and renouncing
the very idea of a physical object is a hard price to pay
for most physicists – this is even more the case nowa-
days, given the impressive progress achieved in getting
full control of individual quantum objects.
In 1964, an important advance took place [4]. The-
oretical and experimental work, initiated by John Bell,
showed that the EPR view could not work as such, and
must at least be amended [5]. Quantum reality does not
abide – at least not entirely – by Einstein’s conditions.
As Bohr’s arguments were either hard to accept or equiv-
ocal, the debate went back to its initial state, and new
questions and theories about the “real objects” involved
in a quantum description kept showing up [6].
B. Physical realism and contextual objectivity.
Yet, if absolute certainty and total predictability could
not be the conditions required to attain quantum real-
ity, perhaps, a different set of rules could make this re-
ality convincing again? This is what is proposed here.
First, we define physical realism with the more consen-
sual statement that “the purpose of physics is to
study entities of the natural world, existing inde-
pendently from any particular observer’s percep-
tion, and obeying universal and intelligible rules”.
Universality and intelligibility are accepted criteria for
scientific realism, perhaps not as strong as full certainty
and predictability, but they may be more efficient in the
QM realm. This being done, would it be possible to gen-
eralize the argument for universality and intelligibility so
as to admit at least parts of Einstein’s and Bohr’s posi-
tions? In an attempt to define what is real in QM, and to
get Einstein and Bohr closer, let us first take into account
the evidence that can be gathered from experience, while
provisionally putting aside the mathematical apparatus
through which this experience is described.
The answer we propose [7] relies on the simple observa-
tion that in quantum physics, like in classical physics, the
values of some physical properties can be measured re-
peatedly, and the results can be predicted with certainty.
But in quantum physics, this can generally be obtained
only by keeping constant all the relevant elements of the
measurement procedure, that we call a context. If we
admit that this complete classical specification of the
context is just the “very condition” required by Bohr,
then the following statement, paraphrasing Einstein’s, is
perfectly fine, also from a quantum point of view: “If,
without in any way disturbing a system, nor chang-
ing the context, we can predict with certainty (i.e.,
with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity”.
This statement satisfies EPR’s idea to look for cer-
tainty in scientific knowledge, as a criterion for reality [8].
The “element of physical reality” that Einstein sought is
present in a deterministic way, but it is submitted to a
condition not perceived in classical physics: the state-
ment is true as long as the context is not changed
[9]. So the element of quantum reality belongs jointly to
the (quantum) system and to the (classical) context, and
2is real as EPR would have wanted, but its reality comes
with a twist: it permanently associates a quantum sys-
tem and a classical context. To distinguish it from other
forms of classical realities, we shall call it a modality.
When associated with quantization – postulated as
an intrinsic property of quantum objects [7] – a change
of context will produce a random change affecting the
modalities of a quantum object, when it shows up in
a different context [7, 8]. This randomness appears in
the form of probabilities, and it can be shown that they
can be computed according to the usual quantum for-
malism [10, 11]. In this approach, the modality is a real
phenomenon involving a system and a context as physi-
cal objects, and it is thus ontologically distinct from the
state vector or projector, which is a mathematical object
used to calculate probabilities. Mixing up these two no-
tions – the real phenomenon on the one hand and the
mathematical object used to describe it on the other –
has been generating a lot of confusion, which is removed
within the quantum realism framework proposed here.
C. What did we learn ?
Our contextual description also tells something about
Einstein’s and Bohr’s respective positions. It does agree
with Einstein’s realism in terms of certainty, necessity,
and therefore physical reality. At the opposite, it clashes
with his classical conviction that physical properties
should be independent of the context in which they are
defined. We have also a good agreement with Bohr’s in-
tuition that the conditions of the measurement must be
taken into consideration: some properties do vary ran-
domly when the context is changed. We attribute this
random change to the fact that elementary physical prop-
erties are quantized, implying that randomness is indeed
essential to understand quantum physical behavior. This
randomness, famously, was refused by Einstein. Though
a final reconciliation between Einstein and Bohr seems
out of scope, both Einstein’s objectivity and Bohr’s con-
textuality do find a common ground in our approach.
Does this new understanding answer the major chal-
lenge of defining quantum reality? We believe that this
is the case, since certainty exists, quantum probabilities
make sense due to quantization, and Bohr’s intuition that
we ought to consider the experimental conditions as an
inherent part of the object under study is given its full
meaning. This only requires that we describe objectivity
in a new more humble way: there is no such a thing as ab-
solute objectivity, i.e. the apprehension of the Universe,
taken as a whole, with all its logical and ontological ne-
cessity as Newton and Einstein conceived it. Contextual
objectivity [12] may provide us with true and efficient
knowledge about the world we live in.
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